An Inductive Approach to Marbury vs. Madison

 Judicial review is among the most fundamental concepts in the American legal system, establishing the Supreme Court’s authority over acts of Congress that violate the Constitution. Chief Justice John Marshall displays a powerful and thorough legal mind in claiming this power for the first time in his Marbury v. Madison opinion.1 His precise and process-driven logic leaves no foothold for detractors searching for holes in his reasoning, while keeping his writing accessible to the general public. Therefore, Marshall’s technique in Marbury is more than worthy of the pervasive legacy that it left behind. 

Marshall’s analytical acuity is best illustrated through the analysis of one argument from his opinion. First, for some case background, Marbury v. Madison involved a few federal judges who President John Adams had signed commissions for in the last days of his term.2 Given the last-minute nature of these ‘midnight commissions,’ the Adams administration failed to deliver all the commissions (including judge William Marbury’s) before the beginning of the incoming Jefferson administration. 

As is to be expected with last-minute judicial appointments, the Jefferson administration was displeased with the rushed appointments; the new Secretary of State, James Madison, refused to deliver the commissions of the new appointees, purposely rendering the appointment process seemingly incomplete and ineffective.3 In response, Marbury sued for a writ of mandamus - a legal remedy of the court that would order Madison to carry out his duty as Secretary of State and force him to deliver Marbury’s commission.4  

In the opening of the opinion, Marshall effectively boils the issue down to three questions: First, does Marbury have a right to the commission? Second, if his right to a commission has been violated, is there an existing legal remedy to this specific situation? Lastly, is the legal remedy in this case a writ of mandamus?5

Marshall addresses each of these questions with finesse, but the dissective and inductive elements of his reasoning style are best displayed as he answers the first one. To do so, Marshall examines the beginnings and endings of the judicial appointment process to verify whether it has been duly completed; if so, Marbury would be entitled to the commission ensuing from that appointment. He traces that process from its broad origins in the Constitution to the very last tiny trivialities, down to the implications of the signature and the affixing of the seal. 

Through meticulous proof, Marshall first determines that the judge’s commission — evidence of his appointment to the bench — is no longer under the control of the Executive once the President’s final signature is affixed: 

“[The President’s signature] is never to be affixed till the commission is signed, because the signature, which gives force and effect to the commission, is conclusive evidence that the appointment is made. The commission being signed, the subsequent duty of the Secretary of State is prescribed by law, and not to be guided by the will of the President. He is to affix the seal of the United States to the commission, and is to record it.”6  

Using these nuanced elements of the appointment process, Marshall concludes that the Executive no longer has power over the appointee or his office once the commission is signed. Therefore, it would directly contradict the separation of powers to have the Executive interfere in a federal judge’s execution of his duty (i.e., withholding the articles of his office). 

Marshall maintains that rigorous method of reasoning as he addresses counterpoints to his argument: Perhaps the appointment process is incomplete without that last step, the physical delivery of the signed commission? He rejects this possibility because, in short, “A commission is transmitted to a person already appointed, not to a person to be appointed or not.” 7 In other words, the fact that the commission was not physically delivered does not affect the plaintiff’s right to that commission. 

He goes into further detail to prove that the physical commission is, in fact, completely irrelevant to the spirit of the appointment process. Were that physical paper an essential to the appointment, then “accident or fire, fraud or theft might deprive an individual of his office.” 8 Yet, in such a case, Marshall notes, a new copy of the commission would be produced that would serve the same purpose as the old one, as provided in the Constitution. In pointing this out, Marshall suggests that if the paper can be lost and subsequently replaced without the appointment being invalid, then evidently the appointment exists outside the constraints of a specific piece of paper. 

Although this distinction is rather abstract, Marshall illustrates it with a situation that a layman could understand. He summarizes the basic principle behind these counterpoints with a postulate: 

“When all the requisites have been performed which authorize a recording officer to record any instrument whatever, and the order for that purpose has been given, the instrument is in law considered as recorded, although the manual labour of inserting it in a book kept for that purpose may not have been performed.” 9

Marshall strings these points together to build a well-cemented conclusion on behalf of the Court, flourishing an inductive style. Firstly, once having signed the commission and affixed the stamp, “[the Executive’s] power over the office is terminated in all cases,” and is now “in the person appointed…”10 Next, Marshall implies what was discussed in the above counterpoints: Since the objections about the delivery of the physical paper are invalid, the sign and seal complete the judicial appointment process. “Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the President and sealed by the Secretary of State, was appointed.”11 Ergo, says Marshall, withholding the commission is “not warranted by law” and “violative of a vested legal right.” 12

Chief Justice John Marshall’s attention to the nuanced facets of his argument, along with a top-down, inductive style of legal interpretation and an unfailing meticulousness characterized his particular approach to opinion-writing. These traits enabled an easier grasp of the legal principles of the United States, and set a transparent tone for the Supreme Court in its nascency. Even the weightiest of Marshall’s opinions remained accessible to scholars and laymen alike, facilitating early confidence in a fundamental American institution that our union still relies on today.

___________

1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

2 Nicholas Mosvick, “Marbury v. Madison and the independent Supreme Court,” Interactive Constitution (24 February 2021). https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/blog/marbury-v-madison-and-the-independent-supreme-court.

3 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2019). 

4 Ibid. 

5 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 

6 Ibid. 

7 Ibid. 

8 Ibid. 

9 Ibid. 

10 Ibid. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Ibid.