The Gradual Erosion of the Old-World Order: Unravelling of International Law and Norms

I. Introduction
June 26, 1945, the UN Charter was signed in San Francisco by 50 countries at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization.[1] It was later entered into force on October 24, 1945, with 51 original signatories; today the Charter has a total of 193 parties to it.[2] The Charter has served as the most important document for International Law, as it establishes a framework to secure global cooperation, alongside the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which ensures all inherent rights and human dignity. The Charter also establishes the relationship between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), under article 7 and article 92, the two bodies are established as independent and equal.[3] Most ICJ cases and advisory opinions that concern territorial integrity and intervention cite the UN Charter and so do all United Nations Security Council Resolutions that regard territorial integrity and secession. Furthermore, the Charter has influenced the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court, the Rome Statute.  Mainly, Article 2(4) of the Charter is what took the idea of territorial integrity from just a political norm to a legal right between states while also upholding the influence of the ICJ and the UNSC.[4]

Historically, as the immediate institutional memory of the atrocities of WWII that led to the establishment of the UN and the ratification of the UN Charter has withered, there is a clear pattern of states and international organizations violating the Charter; as time passes, we can see that the UNSC does not hold the same threshold of enforcement for all member-states. Ultimately, this has led to the bar for what constitutes a violation to be meaningless. Looking at the geopolitical events of the last few months, the UN and the international community must evaluate whether international norms have collapsed or are in the process of collapsing, ultimately raising the question of whether the post-WWII order established between states can be restored or will be redefined on a completely different framework.

II. The Jurisprudence of the ICJ and the Practice of the UNSC 
Four years after the UN Charter entered into force, the ICJ decided its first major post-Charter case, the Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania) (1949).[5] The Court held that the UK’s naval mine-sweeping operation violated Albanian sovereignty while simultaneously finding Albania responsible for failing to notify of the mines in its waters and established the equal application of international law to all states parties to the UN Charter and therefore to the Statute of the International Court of Justice per Article 93(1) of the UN Charter.[6] That includes treaties between the two states, UN resolutions they are party to, and customary international law,[7] like the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 2625 (XXV) on October 24, 1970 (Friendly Relations Declaration).[8] The Friendly Relations Declaration codifies the seven foundational principles of the UN Charter,[9] meaning it explains the appropriate conduct of states in relation to each other. While not binding on its own frequency, the ICJ and UNSC establish it as customary law per Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute, which defines customary international law as a general practice accepted as law.[10]

This trend was upheld in UNSCRs 82, 216, and 217, the first concerning Korea and representing the first Chapter VII enforcement,[11] the latter two regarding Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence.[12] We also see the Court upholding its own precedent, ratifying its own version of the concept of stare decisis, which is present in part in the Statute of the ICJ Article 38(1)(d), which identifies judicial decisions as a subsidiary source of international law and therefore highly persuasive material for the ICJ.[13] This is seen in the Namibia Advisory Opinion of 1971 and Western Sahara Advisory Opinion of 1975.[14] While the UNSC is not bound by ICJ decisions, because, as per UN Charter Article 94, only states parties to a decision are bound to the ruling, the decisions of the Court are highly authoritative and persuasive to the UNSC. In the case of Western Sahara, the Court's decision influenced UNSCRs 379 and 380, which required Morocco to withdraw from Western Sahara.[15] Yet the Council did not enforce its own resolution. This is the first recorded instance of a state-party openly defying the UNSC without facing any enforcement consequence and therefore the first public violation of the UN Charter.[16]

In 1986, the ICJ ruled against the United States in Nicaragua v. United States (1986), upholding its own jurisprudence and reaffirming that the use of force is prohibited under Article 2(4).[17] Yet, like UNSCRs 379 and 380, the resolutions regarding the enforcement of Nicaragua failed but for different reasons. This time, the United States used its P5 veto to block enforcement, effectively asserting through its practice that a court judgment cannot be executed against a permanent member of the Council.[18] This incident showcases the first hole within the structure of the UNSC and its ability to assist in the enforcement of ICJ decisions because the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France could simply not be held accountable by virtue of their status in the Council as they hold veto power.[19] Until 2011, the most consistent use of veto to block accountability for use-of-force came from the U.S., but when it came to the UNSCR concerning the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Russia vetoed sixteen resolutions, frequently joined by China, blocking the framework for accountability for chemical weapons use, the siege of Aleppo, and documented war crimes.[20] This action was a reaction to the NATO airstrikes in Libya that followed the no-fly zone authorization by the Council's resolutions.[21]  Russia and China felt deceived by NATO's actions because the strikes affected their investments in the area. Libya marks the clearest divergence between the UNSC and the ICJ, while the Court consistently followed its own jurisprudence, the UNSC’s principles cannot be effectively enforced because of the P5, and at times as we see with UNSCR 2797, which effectively foreclosed the independence option — for Western Sahara —that the ICJ’s 1975 Advisory Opinion had preserved.[22]

III. The ICC and Its Arrest Warrants
In 1998, the Rome Statute of the ICC, which is the treaty that established the Court, was adopted and entered into force in 2002; it currently has 124 State Parties,[23] including Hungary, which had initiated its withdrawal proceedings in 2025.[24] In 2000, President Clinton signed the Statute,[25] but in 2002, President George W. Bush unsigned the Rome Statute, making the rulings of the ICC not binding on the US. The same year, the American Service-Members’ Protection Act, known as the “Hague Invasion Act,” was passed; this act authorized the use of military force to free any U.S. personnel detained by the ICC.[26]

Until 2024, the ICC had issued a total of 55 arrest warrants.[27] Of those, only four were issued against sitting or former heads of state under Article 27 of the Rome Statute.[28] Article 27, titled the Irrelevance of Official Capacity, removes official capacity as a defence, mandating that the Court treat heads of state identically to all other individuals.[29] Two of those were against Omar Al-Bashir, the sitting president of Sudan, whose first warrant was issued in 2009 and the second in 2010.[30] Until Bashir was removed from power by a military coup in April 2019, he traveled through multiple states party to the ICC without being arrested, including South Africa in 2015, which was later found to violate its Rome Statute obligations through its lack of action.[31] The third warrant was against Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, but because Gaddafi died in October 2011, there is no record of how the international community dealt with their obligation.[32] The fourth warrant was against the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. Putin’s warrant was issued in 2023 for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children.[33] South Africa said it would grant Putin immunity for the 2023 BRICS summit, but eventually, Putin withdrew his attendance.[34] While South Africa did not ultimately execute the warrant, its public announcement of immunity demonstrated the same pattern of political calculation overriding legal obligation. This demonstrates that the Statute applies only selectively by states, protecting their allies yet prosecuting their geopolitical opponents.[35]

IV. Post-2024 Era
Since 2024, world leaders and international organizations have held one of four positions regarding international law and norms. Those three categories consist of leaders who have departed from the framework, have upheld it in theory but selectively defected, and have consistently adhered to the framework.

A. Open Departure from the Established Framework
Leaders worldwide have initiated a complete disregard of the previous positions their countries held in the international community. Going from enforcers and those that maintained a fragile system to those that are intentionally or not rupturing the very principles that have established the world order. This has been building up for the last two years, but the event that showed a clear imbalance was the attacks in Iran. The actions of the United States and Israel should be analyzed in the context of whether they have affected international norms, through the scope of international law and previous precedent, to evaluate whether the previous order has eroded. 

Following the strikes, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that “It is inappropriate to lecture partners and allies when we share many of their goals without actually being able to achieve them ourselves,” and “[i]t is inappropriate to lecture partners and allies when we share many of their goals without actually being able to achieve them ourselves.”[36] This statement, coming from Germany, a country that has long apologized for its wars and has—in the post-WWII era—tried to follow peaceful resolutions, showcases the change in the fabric of international norms.

Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, in her March 2026 Ambassadors conference speech, stated that Europe can no longer be a “Custodian for the old world order.”[37] While the EU has previously maintained order and followed the UN Charter, Leyen argues that the EU can no longer guard the international environment, which has fundamentally shifted away from “outdated” rules. While von der Leyen has since retracted in part her statement,[38] and her position is clear in how Europe should proceed; she has recognized the change and accepted it without trying to save the norms and organizations that were established on the same values as the Union she represents. Von der Leyen’s position is also shared by Kaja Kallas, the EU Foreign Policy Chief, who has only condemned the retaliatory strikes by Iran and not the initial strikes by the US and Israel, such that she has performed a selective legal framing of the conflict.[39] Addressing one side of the conflict, yet completely ignoring the possibility that the other might have committed some violation.

Further, we see that President Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian Prime Minister, invited Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, to Budapest, guaranteeing his safety and freedom from the ICC arrest warrants and rejecting his country’s duty to the Rome Statute to arrest Netanyahu.[40] After Netanyahu’s visit, to solidify Hungary's dismissive nature towards the Rome Statute, Orbán initiated Hungary's exit from the court.[41] He has also been a vocal critic of the sanctions against Russia, and he has asked for the neoliberal EU system to be dismantled rather than reformed.[42]

Finally, the pattern of incremental norm erosion is exemplified by the Trump administration’s second term; limits have been tested, and existing lines have been pushed slowly yet steadily. He has withdrawn the U.S. from 66 organizations including the World Health Organization (WHO),[43] he has imposed sanctions on ICC court officials investigating US allies,[44] he has imposed illegal World Trade Organization (WTO) tariffs that were only struck down because of domestic law,[45] he launched a military capture of the sitting head of Venezuela,[46] and as of March he supported the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, which killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — Iran’s head of state[47]. President Trump has not, unlike previous presidents — including himself in his previous term — tried to hide his international law violations. For instance, Former President Biden’s administration supported Israel’s actions even though the ICJ ruled that there was a risk of genocide in Gaza.[48] His administration vetoed four UNSCRs concerning Gaza, even though they met the same conditions as UNSCRs 661 and 660 regarding Kuwait and Iraq.[49] Former President Barack Obama’s airstrikes in Libya were originally intended to enforce the no-fly zone mandate sanctioned by the UNSC.[50] Former President Bill Clinton launched NATO strikes against Serbia to protect the interests in Kosovo.[51] The pattern is clear: former U.S. presidents have operated within the bounds established by the UN and respected the existing international norms. However, Trump's actions in Iran, Venezuela, and his support of Israel’s actions in Gaza ultimately are obvious, outspoken, and directly contrary to how the U.S. and the West have previously operated.

B. De Jure Compliance, De Facto Non-Compliance
Other leaders have decided to acknowledge the illegality of an action and express their concern, while simultaneously providing material support and political cover to enable such actions. After the ICC issued warrants for the arrests of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant in 2024,[52] states party to the ICC were legally obligated under Article 89 of the Statute to arrest anyone subject to the warrant if they entered their territory.[53] France, a state party to the Statute,  permitted Netanyahu to cross its airspace to attend the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), instead of arresting him when he entered its territory or limiting his access to its airspace, on July 7, 2025.[54] International criminal law scholar Sergey Vasiliev stated that by repeatedly allowing Netanyahu to pass through their airspace, countries “have not only carved out an exception for him, but are also actively normalising this form of deviant behaviour among ICC states parties.”[55] Further, we see that France repeated this in February 2026, claiming that their authorization was “in full compliance with France’s rights and obligations under international law.”[56] France has positioned itself to be one of the ICC’s strongest institutional supporters, yet it has authorized transit for someone accused of war crimes like starvation as a method of warfare; crimes against humanity of murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts; and intentionally directing an attack against the civilian population.[57]

We see the pattern of not holding allies accountable in practice when it comes to the US-Israeli strikes on Iran. Emmanuel Macron, the French President, stated that the action took place “outside of international law,” yet he pledged to deploy aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the eastern Mediterranean Sea, thereby providing material support for the operation he classified as “illegal.”[58] He further framed that Iran bore “primary responsibility" for the escalation, despite participating in diplomatic engagements with the United States shortly before the strikes.[59] This is also repeated by Keir Stramer, the Prime Minister of the UK. Steamer, in the past, has served as a Director of Public Prosecutions and as a human rights barrister who brought international law cases to courts.[60] He initially refused to allow British bases to be used for offensive action, citing doubts about its legality, but, within 24 hours, he reversed his position, claiming that “British jets helping to protect American forces represents the special relationship in action.”[61] Thus, highlighting that states are willing to partake in military action that they themselves have condemned if it benefits their and their allies’ national interests.

C. Consistent Adherence
The last group represents a smaller group of states that have consistently defended international law across all cases, regardless of political cost and agenda. Pedro Sánchez, the Prime Minister of Spain, condemned the airstrikes in Iran as “unjustified, dangerous and illegal”; he denied the US access to military bases at Rota and Moron; he condemned the Venezuela intervention; and he withdrew Spain’s ambassador from Israel.[62] Similar to Sánchez, Norway has similarly called for respect for international law by all parties in the Iran war, including their allies.[63]

In Davos, Mark Carney, the Prime Minister of Canada, delivered an analytical speech on the collapse of international norms. He said, “We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition,” and argued that “the assumptions underpinning the post–Cold War international order no longer hold.”[64] He acknowledged that the rules-based order was always “partially false,’’ but that even if fictional, it was useful as it provided goods between countries.[65] He claimed that goods like trade, supply chains, and tariffs, which were created with the intent of supporting socioeconomic growth and building international alliances, are instead used for coercion.[66]

V. Conclusion
The pattern observed leads us to conclude that the legal foundations of the post-WWII order remain formally unchanged. The UN Charter has not been repealed, the Rome Statute remains in force, and the ICJ still issues decisions. What has collapsed is the political condition that gave the law meaning. The Western Sahara precedent showed that resolutions can be ignored without consequence, Nicaragua showed that a P5 member can use its veto power to avoid accountability, Libya showed that humanitarian centered resolutions can be weaponized, Syria proves that when trust is broken between big powers that smaller states and their people suffer, and Gaza shows that the same principles can simply not be applied based on alliance. Furthermore, the post-2024 events show that world leaders, such as Von der Leyen and Merz, have made compliance with the international norm the least of their priorities.

The international community faces the question of whether the cumulative weight of the violations since 1975 have crossed the threshold, causing the system to be reconstructed without fundamental reform. Ultimately, the goalpost has been moved, with a few actors expressing its complete disappearance. Mark Carney’s statements in Davos prove that the international community needs to be reconstructed in order to survive. Whether what comes next is built on a genuine reformed multilateral framework or on an unmediated power depends on whether the states that still believe in equal sovereignty will tolerate its violation and whether they can construct meaningful political conditions for the Charter. That question does not have a definitive answer yet. But what is certain is that the post-WWII order, as designed and as functioned previously, is no longer operative and that peace between states cannot be sustained if the international community does not build a sustainable framework.‍ ‍

[1] United Nations, The San Francisco Conference, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un/san-francisco-conference

[2]Ibid.

[3] Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, art. 7; art 92

[4]Id. art. 2, para. 4

[5] Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35 (1949)

[6]Ibid.; U.N. Charter art. 93, para. 1

[7] Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b); See Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law. 8th ed. Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 55-58

[8] G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970)

[9]Ibid.

[10] Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b)

[11] S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (1950)

[12] S.C. Res. 216, U.N. Doc. S/RES/216 (1965); S.C. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (965)

[13] Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d)

[14] Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16 (June 21, 1971); Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12 (Oct. 16, 1975)

[15] S.C. Res. 379, U.N. Doc. S/RES/379 (1975); S.C. Res. 380, U.N. Doc. S/RES/380 (1975)

[16] Víctor Kattan, The Security Council Resolutions on Western Sahara and Gaza: Is Decolonisation in Danger? E-International Relations (Dec. 16, 2025), https://www.e-ir.info/2025/12/16/the-security-council-resolutions-is-decolonisation-in-danger/

[17] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Rep. 14 (1986)

[18] U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2704th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2704 (1986); U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2718th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2718 (Oct. 28, 1986)

[19] U.N. Charter art. 27(3)

[20] United Nations, Security Council Veto List

[21] S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (2011)

[22] S.C. Res. 2797, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2797 (2021)

[23] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998)

[24] International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Record of Hungary’s Withdrawal Notification, ICC-ASP (2025)

[25] Statement of President William J. Clinton on Signature of the International Criminal Court Treaty (Dec. 31, 2000), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/443.htm

[26] American Service-Members’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899 (2002) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421–7433)

[27] International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases  (last visited Mar. 28, 2026)

[28]Ibid.; Rome Statute art. 27

[29]Ibid

[30] International Criminal Court, Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest (2009); Second Warrant of Arrest (2010).

[31] International Criminal Court, Decision on the Non-Compliance by the Republic of South Africa, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-302 (2017).

[32] International Criminal Court, Prosecutor v. Muammar Gaddafi and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Warrant of Arrest of Muammar Gaddafi (2011)

[33] International Criminal Court, Situation in Ukraine: Warrant of Arrest for Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, Case No. ICC-01/22-02/23 (2023)

[34] South Africa Government, Statement on BRICS Summit Attendance (July 19, 2023), https://www.dirco.gov.za

[35] Thomas Christiano, The Problem of Selective Prosecution and the Legitimacy of the ICC 7–12 (Mar. 14, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/TChristiano_The_Problem_of_Selective_Prosecution_and_the_Legitimacy_of_the_ICC_2.pdf ; see also William A. Schabas, Victor's Justice: Selecting "Situations" at the International Criminal Court, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 535 (2010); Asad G. Kiyani, Group-Based Differentiation and Local Repression: The Custom and Curse of Selectivity, 14 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 939 (2016)

[36] Friedrich Merz, Press Statement on the Situation in the Middle East (Mar. 1, 2026), https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/chancellor-statement-near-east-2409224

[37] Ursula von der Leyen, Speech at the EU Ambassadors Conference 2026, 2026 (Mar. 9, 2026), https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/eu-institution-news/speech-by-president-von-der-leyen-at-the-eu-ambassadors-conference-2026/

[38] Yahoo News, “After Backlash, Von der Leyen Stresses ‘Unwavering’ Support for Rules-Based Order”, (Mar. 11, 2026), https://sg.news.yahoo.com/backlash-von-der-leyen-stresses-095609596.html

[39] Euronews, Von der Leyen and Kallas Call on EU to Adapt to Coercive World Order (2026), https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/03/09/von-der-leyen-and-kallas-call-on-europe-to-adapt-to-chaotic-coercive-world-order

[40] NBC News, Hungary’s Orbán Breaks with Neighbors to Dismiss ICC’s Arrest Warrant for Netanyahu (Nov. 22, 2024),https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hungarys-orban-breaks-neighbors-dismiss-iccs-arrest-warrant-netanyahu-rcna181305

[41] RFE/RL, During Visit by Israel’s Netanyahu, Hungary Announces It Will Withdraw from ICC (Apr. 3, 2025), https://www.rferl.org/a/icc-warrant-netanyahu-hungary-visit-orban/33370710.html

[42] European Commission, Rule of Law Report: Hungary (2023)

[43] White House, Executive Orders (Jan. 20, 2025); see also World Health Organization, U.S. Withdrawal Notification (Jan. 20, 2025)

[44] White House,Exec. Order No. 14,203, 90 Fed. Reg. 9369 (2025)

[45] Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026) (No. 24-1287)

[46] U.S. Department of War, Trump Announces U.S. Military Capture of Maduro, https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4370431/trump-announces-us-militarys-capture-of-maduro/ (Jan. 3, 2026)

[47] Washington Post, Iran's Supreme Leader Killed in U.S.-Israeli Attack; Tehran Strikes Israel, Arab States, (Feb. 28, 2026), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/02/28/israel-strikes-iran-live-updates/

[48] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (S. Afr. v. Isr.), 2024 ICJ (Jan. 26, 2024)

[49] S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990); see United Nations, Security Council Veto List, supra note 21; see also U.N. SCOR, S/PV.9438 (Oct. 18, 2023); S/PV.9476 (Dec. 8, 2023); S/PV.9553 (Feb. 20, 2024); S/PV.9772 (Nov. 20, 2024) (recording U.S. vetoes of draft resolutions concerning Gaza).

[50] S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 22

[51] S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); NATO, “NATO’s Role in Kosovo,” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48818.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2026) 

[52] International Criminal Court, Situation in the State of Palestine: Warrants of Arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, Case No. ICC-01/18 (Nov. 21, 2024)

[53] Rome Statute art. 89

[54] Middle East Eye, "Was It Legal for France, Italy and Greece to Let Netanyahu Fly over Their Airspace?" (July 27, 2025), https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-netanyahu-icc-arrest-warrant-was-legal-france-italy-greece-airspace

[55]Ibid.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Supra note 21 

[58] PBS NewsHour, Macron Orders France’s Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier to Move from Baltic Sea to Mediterranean (Mar. 3, 2026),  https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/macron-orders-frances-nuclear-powered-aircraft-carrier-to-move-from-baltic-sea-to-mediterranean; PBS NewsHour , A timeline of tensions over Iran's nuclear program as talks with U.S. approach (Feb. 24, 2026), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-timeline-of-tensions-over-irans-nuclear-program-as-talks-with-u-s-approach

[59]Ibid.

[60] Crown Prosecution Service, Former Directors of Public Prosecutions, https://www.cps.gov.uk (last visited Mar. 28, 2026).

[61] Time, “Starmer Stands by Decision to Not Join Initial Strikes on Iran” (Mar. 4, 2026), https://time.com/7382692/starmer-trump-iran-war-conflict-united-kingdom-response/

[62] Politico Europe, Spain's Pedro Sánchez Emerges as EU's Chief Critic of Donald Trump's War in Iran (Mar. 3, 2026), https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-pedro-Sánchez-emerges-eu-chief-critic-donald-trump-war-in-iran/; Al Jazeera, "Spain Removes Ambassador from Israel in Protest to Iran War, Gaza Genocide" (Mar. 11, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/11/spain-removes-ambassador-from-israel-as-opposes-war-on-iran-gaza-genocide

[63] Jonas Gahr Støre, Statement on the Situation in the Middle East, Norwegian Prime Minister's Office (Feb. 28, 2026), https://www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/statement-from-prime-minister-jonas-gahr-store-about-the-situation-in-the-middle-east/id3150569/

[64] Mark Carney, Special Address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, Youtube (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flsgJe8mN-A

[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid.